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In the final paragraph of Section One, Part One, 
Book Three of the Treatise—the famous 'is-ought 
paragraph 1—Hume appears to impose a non-naturalistic 
constraint on any adequate theory of moral judgment. 
The paragraph reads: 
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an 
observation, which may perhaps be found of some 
importance. In every system of morality which I 
have hitherto met with I have always remarked 
that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to 
find that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions is and is not I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought 
or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but 
is however of the last consequence. For as this 
ought or ought not expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be 
observed and explained; and at the same time that 
a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation 
can be a deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it. But as authors do 
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume 
to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded 
that this small attention would subvert all 
vulgar systems of morality and let us see that 
the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded 
merely on the relations of objects nor is 
perceived by reason. 
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The traditional interpretation of this paragraph 
takes Hume as arguing for an unbridgeable logical gap 
between descriptive premises and an evaluative 
conclusion. It is not irrational for a disputant 
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according to Hume to concede the factual premises of 
his opponent while denying the evaluative conclusion. 
In order for the descriptive premises to entail the 
conclusion, some intervening premise would be required, 
the nature of which Hume does not specify. 
The difficulty with the received interpretation, 
however, is that Hume's own version of a valid moral 
argument—even as he summarizes it briefly in the 
paragraph preceding the 'is-ought paragraph'—seems to 
conflict with the logical canon enshrined by the 
classical reading of 'is-ought'. In the penultimate 
paragraph of Section One, Hume says that 
The vice entirely escapes you as long as you 
consider the object. You never can find it, till 
you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and 
find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises 
in you towards this action. Here is a matter of 
fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of 
reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. 
So that when you pronounce any action or 
character to be vicious, you mean nothing but 
that from the constitution of your nature you 
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
contemplation of it. Vice and virtue therefore 
may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold 
which according to modern philosophy are not 
qualities in objects, but perceptions in the 
mind: And this discovery in morals, like that 
other in physics, is to be regarded as a 
considerable advancement of the speculative 
sciences; tho' like that too it has little or no 
influence on practice. Nothing can be more real 
or concern us more than our own sentiments of 
pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be 
favorable to virtue, and unfavorable to vice, no 
more can be requisite,to the regulation of our 
conduct and behavior. 
In apparent contradiction of the 'is-ought 
paragraph' which immediately follows, Hume in the above 
passage seems to derive moral judgments directly from a 
statement indicating the presence of certain feelings 
of pleasure or pain in man. To make the 'is-ought 
paragraph' accord with Hume's philosophical practice 
has therefore been the object of many of the modern 
reinterpretations of the paragraph. Alisdair 
Maclntyre, in an article entitled "Hume on 'Is' and 
'Ought'", turns the received interpretation on its 
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head and reads Hume as saying that a deduction from 
factual premises to an evaluative conclusion is 
possible. The crucial words which he regards the 
traditional interpretation as misconstruing are: "for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others". The first 
phrase was read ironically—the word 'seems' was not 
taken literally—and the second phrase was read 
literally—'deduction' was taken to mean strict 
entailment. MacIntyre argues that the reverse should 
be the case that 'seems' should be read literally and 
'deduction' should be interpreted broadly to mean 
simply inference. Read in this way, Hume would be 
understood as saying that an inference from a factual 
premise to an evaluative conclusion can be drawn if one 
abandons the model of strict entailment. A 
nonevaluative middle premise that can support an 
evaluative conclusion according to Maclntyre's reading 
of Hume would be one that stated that a particular 
course of action represented what the common consensus 
regarded as furthering the public interest. Maclntyre 
says that the requirement of an additional evaluative 
premise to the effect that whatever is in everyone's 
long-term interest should be done would be redundant 
for Hume, because the notion of consensus of interest 
just forms an essential part of what the word "ought" 
means. 
A major flaw in Maclntyre's account consists, I 
think, in his ignoring the literal import of the 'is-
ought paragraph'. Read literally, the paragraph states 
that one cannot move from a factual premise to an 
evaluative conclusion without introducing some 
intervening non-factual premise. That this is not an 
isolated belief on Hume's part but forms an integral 
part of his case against the rationalists is evidenced 
by his utilizing the argument against Wollaston in a 
famous footnote. There Hume pointed out that there 
was a circularity in Wollaston's account of morals, 
since in order to show that giving rise to a falsehood 
was at the root of all our designations of things as 
evil Wollaston would first have had to show that lying 
itself is evil. The proper form of moral argument that 
seems to emerge from Hume's critique of Wollaston is 
the following: 
Falsehoods should not be perpetrated. 
This particular action gives rise to a falsehood. 
Therefore, this particular action should not be 
done. 
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A second major reinterpretation of the 'is-ought 
paragraph* has been given by Geoffrey Hunter, who 
follows the lead of Professor Gilbert Ryle. Hunter 
allows the two phrases that Maclntyre reinterpreted to 
stand exactly as they were in the traditional view, 
while claiming that the context of Hume's moral 
philosophy makes clear his intention in the 'is-ought 
paragraph'. The logical gap between factual premises 
and evaluative conclusion that the received 
interpretation points to makes moral judgment 
impossible only if one believes that to utter a moral 
judgment is to make a non-factual statement. The whole 
point of Hume's moral philosophy, however, is to 
indicate the factual basis of moral judgments, that all 
they simply do is report a particular agent's feelings 
concerning certain objects or states of affairs. What 
the paragraph underscores is the logical problem that 
religious moralists, say, face when they regard moral 
judgments as something other than an agent's starting 
his feelings when confronted by a particular situation. 
Hunter himself voices a most serious criticism 
against his analysis of Hume's theory of moral judgment 
when he says that according to his account Hume becomes 
incapable of explaining ethical disagreement. If all 
one does in making a moral judgment is report on his 
emotional reaction to a contemplated course of action, 
say, then it is entirely possible for two disputants to 
admit to each other that their opponent's feelings move 
them in ways directly contrary to their own feelings, 
thus effectively preventing ethical disagreement from 
ever getting off the ground. Also, Hunter, like 
Maclntyre, in ignoring the literal import of the 
paragraph, fails to do justice to a key element in 
Hume's argument against the rationalists. 
In trying to determine to what extent the account 
of morals in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals diverges from or expands upon the argument found 
in the Treatise, we are afforded an insight, I believe, 
into how to construe the 'is-ought paragraph' in a way 
that will both accommodate Hume's criticism of the 
rationalists as well as render intelligible his own 
theory of moral judgement. The second Enquiry, as far 
as I can tell, refines the argument in the Treatise 
mainly in two ways. First, though Section Two, Part 
One, Book Three of the Treatise is entitled, "Moral 
Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense", the notion of 
a separate moral sense practically disappears from view 
once we get into the body of the argument. What Hume 
argues for in the Section itself is the equation of the 
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feelings we experience in disinterestedly contemplating 
the harmful or beneficial results of certain tendencies 
of character or states of affairs with the moral 
distinction between good and evil. In Section One of 
the second Enquiry, on the other hand, Hume is quite 
explicit about the independent status of the moral 
sense. He says that "this final sentence [of 
approbation or censure] depends on some internal sense 
or feeling, which nature has made universal in the 
whole species. For what else can have an influence of 
this nature?" Apparently, in order to satisfy his 
readers, and perhaps himself, of the truly scientific, 
i.e., universal, character of his explanation of the 
foundation of moral judgment, Hume felt compelled in 
the second Enquiry to regard the mechanism of approval 
and disapproval described earlier in the Treatise as 
the manifestation of a special moral sense implanted in 
the species by the Designer of Nature. 
A second elaboration, which emerges in the second 
Enquiry occurs in Appendix I and is contained in the 
following two paragraphs: 
It appears evident that the ultimate ends of 
human actions can never, in any case, be 
accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves 
entirely to the sentiments and affections of 
mankind without any dependence on the 
intellectual faculties. Ask a man why he uses 
exercise; he will answer because he desires to 
keep his health. If you then enquire why he 
desires health he will readily reply because 
sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries 
farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, 
it is impossible he can ever give any. This is 
the ultimate end, and is never referred to any 
other object. 
Perhaps to your second question, why he 
desires health, he may also reply, that it is 
necessary for the exercise of his calling. If 
you ask why he is anxious on that head he will 
answer because he desires to get money. If you 
demand Why? It is the instrument of pleasure 
says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to 
ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be 
a progress in infinity; and that one thing can 
always be a reason why another is desired. 
Something must be desirable on its own account, 
and because of its immediate accord.or agreement 
with human sentiment and affection. 
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Hume's argument here, I believe, is crucial for an 
understanding of his views on moral judgment, and 
indeed of the structure of argument in his philosophy 
as a whole. It is very easy to misinterpret Hume in 
this passage. One might think that he is making the 
rather innocuous-sounding logical point that in order 
to avoid an infinite regress an argument must stop 
somewhere, and he has found it most plausible to rest 
his argument in morals with a statement to the effect 
that a particular type of character or state of affairs 
is most conducive to pain or pleasure. Viewed in this 
light, the argument is singularly unpersuasive, because 
we are not told why we should stop at this particular 
resting-place. We have escaped an infinite regress 
only at the cost of ah arbitrariness that may leave us 
equally dissatisfied. 
I believe that if read correctly Hume in this 
passage does meet the charge of arbitrariness by moving 
the argument on to a different level. The crucial 
phrases in the passage in my view are "but recommend 
themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of 
mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual 
faculties", in the first paragraph, and "Something must 
be desirable on its own account, and because of its 
immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and 
affection" in the second. These words should be 
construed entirely literally. The reason why a 
statement concerning an object's conduciveness towards 
pain or pleasure can serve as an ultimate statement in 
an argument is because when we speak the language of 
pain or pleasure we are no longer speaking the pure 
language of reasons, but have introduced the idiom of 
causes, i.e., the idiom of universal connection. We 
are so constituted that we want to avoid pain and seek 
whatever affords us pleasure. The feelings of pleasure 
and pain that precede and accompany the utterance of a 
moral judgment conform to the general rules Hume lays 
down for distinguishing genuine causal, relations from 
mere haphazard connections in nature. The feeling of 
pleasure and pain are contiguous in time with the 
judgment and are always experienced prior to it. A 
constant union is evident between the cause and the 
effect, and we can say with pragmatic certainty that 
the same cause always produces the same effect and the 
same effect never arises but from the same cause. 
Thus, according to Hume, without experiencing the 
conjunction on any particular occasion, we are licensed 
to predict, on the basis of past evidence, that the 
feeling will occasion the judgment. 
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The object of Hume's criticism in the passages 
quoted above from the second Enquiry is any 
justificatory mode of argument which seeks to base 
itself on the language of reasons. The inevitability 
of an infinite regress does not undermine any 
particular set of reasons, but the very language of 
reasons itself. One cannot offer a decisive argument 
in morals, or elsewhere, simply by citing reasons for 
the choice one is defending, because one's choice of 
reasons is always open to the further question 'Why?' 
which can never logically be foreclosed. To avoid this 
regress one must shift the level of argument to a plane 
which precludes the intrusion of personal judgment, 
desire or reasons. This is the plane of scientifically 
ascertainable causes, which exhibit a universal 
correlation between certain sentiments in man and 
particular states of affairs. This is a case of 
science forstalling the endless disquisitions of reason 
by pointing to what is objectively verifiable and 
universally present. 
All ingredients are present in Hume on moral 
judgment, I believe, for an interpretation of his 
thought along strictly causalist lines—in fact of a 
particular kind of causal., explanation, Hempel's 
deductive-nomological model. Let us take as an 
example the moral duty of gratitude, which Hume himself 
utilizes in his arguments against Wollaston. How does 
this duty arise for Hume? First there are certain 
facts to be considered, what one might describe as 
initial conditions. Mr. Jones has been X's benefactor. 
He has generously endowed X's entire education, making 
it possible for X to achieve whatever economic or 
social status he has. He has now asked a special favor 
of X, to serve as a tutor to his grandchild, and advise 
him on his education needs. According to Hume, once 
these initial factors are given, an almost automatic 
process ensues. X feels a sentiment of approbation 
well up within him at the thought of showing gratitude 
towards his benefactor. An element of conscious 
reflection enters for Hume in the fact that this 
sentiment arises when X considers the virtue of 
gratitude in a relatively disinterested fashion—i.e., 
the overall benefits to be reaped from a widespread 
adoption of the social practice of showing graditude. 
When X pursues this thought—and according to Hume we 
are so constituted by the operation of sympathy that we 
cannot help entertaining this thought if we have been 
properly socialized and educated—a sentiment of 
approval follows. This sentiment of approval 
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undergirds the moral judgment that the act of gratitude 
in question ought to be performed. 
We may now translate Hume's theory of moral 
judgment into the following neutral covering law 
schema: 
(1) Event to be explained: Y's moral judgment 
that X's account of gratitude should be performed. 
(2) Initial Conditions: X knows that Jones is 
his benefactor. 
(3) Covering Law: When Y considers 
disinterestedly the effects of performing the act 
of gratitude in question, a sentiment of 
approbation wells up within him; when he finds 
someone refraining from performing such an act of 
gratitude, he is overcome with disapproval. 
(This law of course would apply to any human 
being whose vantage point was similar to Y's, 
since we all possess a similar capacity for 
sympathy.) 
We are now in a position to grasp the true import 
of the 'is-ought paragraph'. Neither the 
descriptivist interpretation offered by Maclntyre, 
nor the subjectivist interpretation advanced by Hunter, 
is correct. Maclntyre's interpretation is predicated 
upon the assumption that a deductive account is ruled 
out, and he is chiefly preoccupied with discovering 
what other sorts of bridge notions between a factual 
statement and a moral imperative are possible for Hume. 
Hunter by offering a subjectivist interpretation makes 
it impossible for Hume to account for ethical 
disagreement. In contrast to both Maclntyre and 
Hunter, I believe that the context of Hume's chapters 
on moral judgment in both the Treatise and the second 
Enquiry indicate that he believes that his 
interpretation of moral judgment succeeds where others 
have failed precisely because it is a deductivist 
explanation of a special sort, which takes the laws of 
human nature into account. 
Hume's argument against Wollaston, for example, is 
not simply that he fails to recognize the need to 
justify the additional premise that acts of lying are 
wrong. If my interpretation of Hume in Appendix I to 
the second Enquiry is correct, then he wishes to level 
the additional argument against Wollaston that no 
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matter what one's ultimate premise is—whether lying is 
one's summum malum or something else—one could never 
meet the charge of arbitrariness. Any purely 
justificatory account of moral judgment would have to 
fail because it could not meet this charge. Only a x 
causal, deductivist account of moral judgment would 
remedy the deficiencies that Hume finds in the 
arguments of his predecessors—that they arbitrarily 
take certain ends of human nature for granted, thereby 
falsifying the relationship between reason and the 
passions; that they fail to realize that a middle 
premise is needed linking together a statement of a 
particular state of affairs with the utterance of a 
moral judgment; that they overlook the fact that no 
matter what particular factual or evaluative middle 
premise they choose their attempt is bound to founder 
on the charge of arbitrariness. Only a deductivist 
account of moral judgment, which deduces moral 
judgments from certain universal psychological laws 
concerning human nature, could fill the breach created 
by Hume's attacks on his predecessors and 
contemporaries. 
Considering the particular constraints that Hume 
has placed on an adequate theory of moral argument, his 
non-cognitivism and non-naturalism, he faces an 
especially acute dilemma at this point in outlining his 
own theory of moral judgment. If the only logically 
proper form of moral argument is couched in the idiom 
of universal law, then the conclusion of such an 
argument can only be stated in third-person discourse: 
So-and-so will judge such-and-such on a particular 
occasion. No implication, of course, follows from this 
concerning the correctness of the judgment. In the 
logical rigor which he imposes on the proper form of 
moral argument, the most essential feature of such an 
argument, its conclusion that a particular judgment is 
correct, seems to have eluded Hume's grasp. How does 
Hume make the move from his discussion of the logical 
constraints upon moral argument to a delineation of a 
particular form of argument that would entail the 
conclusion, "And the moral judgment is correct?". 
The correctness of the moral judgment that the 
conclusion of the argument in third person discourse 
yields is already guaranteed, I think, in the premises 
of the argument. By referring to the mechanism of 
sympathy in his premises, the spectator is already 
making a covert reference to the correctness of the 
judgment, since what attests to its correctness for 
Hume is just the fact that it is motivated by sympathy. 
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Reference to the human capacity for sympathetic 
identification with judgments rendered by a relatively 
disinterested spectator serves as the only legitimate 
bridge premise between a statement of initial 
conditions of a situation (a factual premise) and an 
evaluative conclusion. The human capacity for sympathy 
vindicates a particular moral judgment arising in a 
specific factual context by grounding the judgment in a 
permanent feature of man. While reference to a 
universal capacity for sympathy seems the only premise 
capable,gf satisfying Hume's strictures concerning 'is-
ought', it also ensures that the scientific 
generalizations pronounced by a spectator will reflect 
the ethically correct judgment applicable in a 
particular situation. 
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